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How to Cut a Cake Fairly:
A Generalization to Groups
Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong
Abstract. A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with
arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player
receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious. We generalize this result by
showing that it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired sizes and divide
the cake among the groups so that each group receives a single contiguous piece, and no player
finds the piece of another group better than that of the player’s own group.
1. INTRODUCTION. In a small town, there is a public basketball court in which
ten players (two teams of five players each) can play at a time. On a certain Sunday,
30 players want to play on the court, and they have different preferences regarding the
time of day at which they prefer to play. The court manager therefore needs to partition
the players into three groups of ten players each, and divide the time of day into three
contiguous intervals—one interval per group—so that each group of ten can play in its
designated time slot. To avoid complaints, the manager would like the partition to be
envy-free: every player should believe that the time slot in which he or she plays is at
least as good as each of the time slots given to the other two groups.
In this note, we show that no matter what the players’ preferences on the time of day
are, there always exists a partition of the players together with an envy-free division of
the time into contiguous time slots.
2. CAKE CUTTING. Before we describe our setting formally, let us take a step
back and ask a simpler question: Instead of a group activity like basketball, what if
we are trying to divide the time for an individual activity, say running on a treadmill?
In this case, there is no need to partition the players, since only one player will use
the treadmill at a time. The challenge thus lies in dividing the time and assigning the
resulting time slots to the players in such a way that no player envies another.
It turns out that this simpler setting falls precisely under the well-studied framework
of cake cutting.1 The cake serves as a metaphor for resources such as time or land, and
the aim is to divide the cake between players in a fair manner. Formally, there are n
players, and the cake is represented by an interval of length 1. Each (contiguous) n-
partition of the cake can be defined by an n-tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
∑n
i=1 xi = 1,
where xi ≥ 0 denotes the length of the ith piece from the left. Given a partition, we
say that a player prefers a certain piece if the player thinks there is no better piece in
the partition; note that this preference can depend on the entire partition. Each player
prefers at least one piece in any given partition, and may prefer more than one piece in
case of ties.
The following two (weak) assumptions on the players’ preferences are standard in
the literature [14, 16]:
1. Hungry players. Players never prefer an empty piece.
2. Closed preference sets. Any piece that is preferred for a convergent sequence of
partitions is also preferred at the limiting partition.
1Several excellent surveys on the subject are available, e.g., [3, 11].
1
A seminal result in cake cutting is that, as long as these two assumptions are sat-
isfied, an envy-free division of the cake always exists. It was proved some decades
ago in this MONTHLY by Stromquist [14] via topological arguments and Su [16] using
Sperner’s lemma, and generalizes earlier results by Dubins and Spanier [5], also in this
MONTHLY, and Woodall [19].
Theorem 1 ([14, 16]). Let n be any positive integer. For n hungry players with closed
preference sets, there is always a partition of the cake into n contiguous pieces such
that each player prefers a different piece.
Theorem 1 is an existence result, so the reader may naturally wonder how one could
compute a desired solution. When there are two players, a contiguous envy-free divi-
sion can be found using the so-called “cut-and-choose” protocol: the first player cuts
the cake into two pieces so that she prefers both of them (this is always possible due
to our two assumptions), and the second player chooses a piece that she prefers. For
any number of players, however, the problem becomes surprisingly difficult—for ex-
ample, with three players, Stromquist [15] showed that no finite algorithm can always
compute such a division. We refer the reader to [6] and the references therein for more
details.
3. OUR RESULT. Let us now return to our basketball court example and introduce
a generalization of the cake-cutting model that captures it. Again, there are n players
who have preferences over the cake. However, unlike in canonical cake cutting, we are
also given positive integers k1, k2, . . . , km whose sum is n, and the players should be
divided intom groups with group j containing kj players. The cake is then partitioned
into m pieces, and group j is assigned the jth piece from the left. Our example thus
corresponds to the case where n = 30, m = 3, and k1 = k2 = k3 = 10. In general,
the group sizes may be different—for example, if only 28 players come to the court,
the manager may decide to split them into two groups of ten and one group of eight.
A first idea that comes to mind for proving the existence of an envy-free allocation
is to apply Theorem 1 to the individual players, and then group them according to
their time slots. Specifically, given an envy-free allocation to the individuals such that
player i gets piece i in the n-partition (x1, x2, . . . , xn), we construct groups G1 =
{1, 2, . . . , k1}, G2 = {k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k1 + k2}, and so on. We then take the
m-partition (y1, y2, . . . , ym) where yj =
∑
i∈Gj
xi, and allocate the jth piece from
the left to group Gj . Unfortunately, this idea does not work—the resulting allocation
might not be envy-free. Indeed, going back to our basketball example, it is possible
that player 7 prefers piece 7 to all other 29 pieces in the partition (x1, x2, . . . , x30),
but does not prefer the union of pieces 1, 2, . . . , 10 to the union of pieces 11, 12, . . . ,
20 in the partition (y1, y2, y3).
Nevertheless, we establish below that an envy-free allocation is guaranteed to exist
in this general setting.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ m be any positive integers, and let k1, k2, . . . , km be positive
integers such that
∑m
j=1 kj = n. For n hungry players with closed preference sets,
there is always a partition of the cake intom contiguous pieces, along with a division
of the players intom groups with group j containing kj players, such that each player
in group j prefers the jth piece from the left in the partition.
Note that Theorem 2 is a strict generalization of Theorem 1: taking n = m and
kj = 1 for all j reduces the former theorem to the latter. Before we prove Theorem 2,
a few remarks are in order.
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If the partition of the players into groups is fixed in advance (in contrast to our
setting), then an envy-free allocation is no longer guaranteed to exist. For example,
suppose there are two groups, each of which contains a player who prefers to play
in the morning (specifically, only prefers the piece containing the interval [0, 0.1] if
such a piece exists in the partition) and a player who prefers to play in the evening
(specifically, only prefers the piece containing the interval [0.9, 1] if such a piece exists
in the partition). Regardless of how the interval [0, 1] is partitioned and assigned to the
two groups, it is not hard to see that at least one player will be envious.
In light of this negative result, relaxations have been proposed for the fixed-group
setting, for instance allowing more than one connected piece per group [12] or ensur-
ing fairness only for a certain fraction of the players in each group [2, 13]. Both of
these solutions are far from ideal in our basketball example. Hence, the possibility of
constructing ad hoc groups plays a crucial role in ensuring that each group receives a
contiguous piece and all players are nonenvious.2
Theorem 2 can be shown by applying a generalized Sperner-type lemma similar to
the one proved recently by Meunier and Su [10]. However, here we present a simpler
proof using Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first introduce some notation. For every positive integer t,
denote by [t] the set {1, 2, . . . , t}. For each j ∈ [m], denote by Kj the sum of sizes
of the first j groups, i.e., Kj :=
∑j
j′=1 kj′ , and let K0 := 0. Let Gj := {Kj−1 +
1,Kj−1 + 2, . . . ,Kj}. Note that |Gj | = kj and ∪j∈[m]Gj = [n].
We are given n hungry players. The preferences of each player i ∈ [n] are repre-
sented by a demand function fi, which assigns to eachm-partition a nonempty subset
of [m] representing the indices of the pieces that player i prefers in that partition.
For each player i ∈ [n], we construct a new demand function gi, which assigns
to each n-partition x = (x1, . . . , xn) a nonempty subset of [n]. The function gi is
constructed as follows.
• Given an n-partition x, construct anm-partition x̂ by uniting the k1 leftmost inter-
vals into a single interval, the next k2 intervals into another single interval, and so
on. Formally, for each j ∈ [m], let x̂j :=
∑
i∈Gj
xi.
• Find fi(x̂)— the preferred piece(s) of player i in them-partition x̂.
• For every j ∈ fi(x̂), let Mj := argmaxi∈Gj xi. That is, Mj contains the indices
of the interval(s) in x that are longest among the subintervals of interval j in x̂.
• Let gi(x) := ∪j∈fi(x̂)Mj .
Going back to our basketball example, suppose that fi(x̂) = {2}, so in partition x̂
player i prefers to play in the middle time slot. Suppose that in partition x the longest
among the pieces 11, 12, . . . , 20 are pieces 14 and 17. Then gi(x) = {14, 17}.
Next, we show that gi satisfies the two assumptions that are necessary in order to
apply Theorem 1. Since the function fi represents a hungry player, fi(x̂) does not
contain any empty piece. Hence, gi(x), too, does not contain any empty piece, so gi
also represents a hungry player.
We now claim that gi satisfies the closed preference sets assumption. To see this,
consider a sequence (xd)d∈N of n-partitions such that for all partitions in the sequence,
2Envy-freeness with variable groups as in our model has recently been studied for different problems:
allocating indivisible items between two groups [8], and dividing rooms and rent [1, 7]. For fixed groups, fair
division has been investigated using a probabilistic approach [9] and with respect to other fairness notions [17];
see [18] for an overview.
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gi(x
d) contains some fixed k ∈ [n]. Suppose that the sequence converges to a partition
x
∞. To establish the claim, it suffices to show that k ∈ gi(x
∞).
For each d ∈ N, let x̂d be the m-partition derived from xd by uniting adjacent
intervals as in the construction of gi. The sequence (x̂
d)d∈N converges to some m-
partition x̂∞. The assumption that k ∈ gi(x
d) implies that for all d ∈ N:
(1) j ∈ fi(x̂
d), where j is the unique index in [m] for which k ∈ Gj ;
(2) xdk ≥ x
d
k′ for all pieces k
′ ∈ Gj .
From (1) and since fi satisfies the closed preference sets assumption, we have j ∈
fi(x̂
∞). In addition, it follows from (2) that x∞k ≥ x
∞
k′ for all k
′ ∈ Gj . The construc-
tion of gi now implies that k ∈ gi(x
∞), as claimed.
We have shown that the preferences represented by (gi)i∈[n] satisfy the two require-
ments of Theorem 1. Therefore, there exists an n-partition y in which each player
i ∈ [n] “prefers” a different piece according to gi. Let π : [n] → [n] be a bijection
such that player i prefers piece π(i). In particular, we have π(i) ∈ gi(y).
Finally, let ŷ be the m-partition derived from y by uniting adjacent intervals as in
the construction of x̂. For each j ∈ [m], allocate the jth piece in ŷ to group π−1(Gj).
For every player i ∈ π−1(Gj), since π(i) ∈ gi(y), the construction of gi implies that
j ∈ fi(ŷ), that is, player i prefers piece j in ŷ. Hence the constructedm-allocation ŷ
is envy-free for the original players.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS. Theorem 2 allows the players’ preferences to de-
pend on the group size. For instance, suppose m = 2, k1 = 8, and k2 = 10. Then,
given a partition, each player may decide whether he or she prefers to play in the ear-
lier time slot in a group of eight, or in the later time slot in a group of ten.3 The resulting
allocation respects these preferences as long as they satisfy the closed preference sets
assumption and the hungry players assumption—in particular, if the earlier piece is
empty, then every player must prefer the later piece, and vice versa, regardless of the
group sizes.
However, the theorem does not allow the players’ preferences to depend on the
identity of the other players assigned to the same group. In fact, with this extension,
the existence guarantee ceases to hold. For instance, if there is a popular player, say
Alice, such that all other players prefer to play with Alice than not, then the players
who are assigned to a different group than hers will necessarily be envious.
Form ≥ 3 groups, the result of Stromquist [15] implies that no finite protocol can
find a contiguous envy-free division even in the simplest case in which each group
consists of a single player. However, for m = 2 groups (and n = k1 + k2 players), a
simple protocol finds a contiguous envy-free division, as long as the players’ prefer-
ences satisfy a third condition (in addition to “hungry players” and “closed preference
sets”):
3. Monotone preferences. Let P1 and P2 be partitions such that for some ℓ ∈ [m],
the ℓth piece of P1 is contained in the ℓth piece of P2, while for every j ∈ [m]
such that j 6= ℓ, the jth piece of P2 is contained in the jth piece of P1. Then, if
a player prefers the ℓth piece of P1, he or she also prefers the ℓth piece of P2.
Note that Stromquist’s impossibility result for three groups is valid even with mono-
tone preferences. The protocol for two groups works as follows:
3A related problem is the group activity selection problem, where each player also has a preference over
certain activities and the number of players involved in each activity [4]. However, in our setting a player’s
preference depends in addition on the “resource” to which his or her activity is allocated.
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• Let each player i ∈ [n]mark a pointxi ∈ [0, 1] so that the player prefers both [0, xi]
and [xi, 1]. Such a point must exist by the hungry players and closed preference sets
assumptions.
• Order the marks from left to right, breaking ties arbitrarily.
• Cut the cake at some point y between the k1th mark and the (k1 + 1)st mark from
the left.
• Assign the piece [0, y] to the players who made the k1 leftmost marks, and the piece
[y, 1] to the remaining k2 players. The monotone preferences assumption guaran-
tees that all agents prefer their allocated piece.
The problem of computing an envy-free allocation without the monotone preferences
assumption remains for future work.
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